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PERPETUAL EVOLUTION: A SCHOOLS-FOCUSED PUBLIC
LAW LITIGATION MODEL FOR OUR DAY
James S. Liebman*
In celebrating the monumental accomplishments of the new form of
public law litigation that Constance Baker Motley and her colleagues
pioneered, this Essay reinterprets their paradigm-shifting body of work in
a manner that obliges the current generation of civil rights advocates to
change direction. In the hopes of reengaging the affirmative force of constitutional litigation after decades in which it has waned, this Essay
argues that the central lesson to be derived from Motley’s generation lies
not in the mode of public law litigation it pioneered but in the design of
that litigation in the image of the dominant form of governance of the
day: bureaucracy. Today, however, bureaucracy’s penchant for uniformity
disqualifies it as a model judges can use to engineer the change needed
by millions of children of color and in poverty trapped in failing
schools. Today’s advocates can best honor Motley, therefore, by identifying the most generative form of governance of our own day and
developing a model of public law litigation in its image. In that vein,
this Essay advocates a duty of “responsible administration” of the public
schools designed in the image of a more modern and effective form of
governance: evolutionary learning. Drawing upon multiple analogies
in modern legal practice, this duty requires officials responsible for
students’ egregiously deﬁcient and suspiciously disparate levels of educational attainment to track results, develop and test solutions, and use
successes to set a progressively rising constitutional minimum for similarly situated students.
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INTRODUCTION
This Essay honors Judge Constance Baker Motley and her contemporaries at the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.1 It celebrates their victory in
Brown v. Board of Education2 and the vast amounts of “public law litigation”3 that ensued. This litigation beneﬁcially restructured the nation’s
previously segregated schools4 and means of ﬁnancing public education,5
1. In addition to Judge Motley, my neighbor and daily inspiration, I dedicate this
piece to my mentor and friend Jack Greenberg (1924–2016), who shared Judge Motley’s
work and lifelong commitment to racial justice.
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3. “Public law litigation” refers herein to lawsuits on behalf of classes of plaintiffs
seeking affirmative injunctions vindicating public policies by restructuring institutions’ operations and outcomes. The Essay contends that the governance model (bureaucracy,
evolutionary learning, or something else) that inﬂuences the litigation’s focal policies and
remedies also affects its likely success. For discussions of public law litigation, see, e.g.,
Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 4,
4 (1982) (deﬁning “public law litigation” and providing examples); Abram Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281, 1284 (1976) [hereinafter
Chayes, Role of the Judge] (same); see also Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1015, 1016–20
(2004) [hereinafter Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights] (discussing the evolution of
legal scholarship regarding public law litigation and introducing the concept of “destabilization rights”); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, The Duty of Responsible Administration and the Problem of Police Accountability, 33 Yale J. on Reg. 165, 166–69 (2016)
[hereinafter Sabel & Simon, Duty of Responsible Administration] (discussing the evolution
of civil rights doctrine and postbureaucratic administration). But cf. Theodore Eisenberg
& Stephen C. Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93
Harv. L. Rev. 465, 465–67, 481–86 (1980) (arguing that public law litigation is not a new form
of litigation and that judicial supervision of complex enterprises is an old legal phenomenon).
4. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 37 (1990) (upholding the district court’s
desegregation order, as modified by the court of appeals); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526, 528–29 (1979) (affirming the district court’s “system wide plan for desegregating the public schools of Dayton, Ohio”); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (affirming the district court’s broad authority to order remedial desegregation); Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (rejecting the school
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as well as its criminal justice systems,6 police forces,7 prisons,8 mental
health facilities,9 welfare agencies,10 and other public systems found to be
failing large swaths of the American people, most of them of color or in
poverty. By mobilizing the affirmative force of constitutional courts to
make massive collective improvements in the lives of millions of chronically underserved individuals, the public law litigation Brown inspired is
certainly one of the most successful acts of social engineering and improvement in the nation’s history.11
In honor of Judge Motley, however, this Essay reinterprets her and
her colleagues’ paradigm-shifting body of legal work in a manner that
obliges the current generation of civil rights advocates to change direction. It does so in hopes of re-engaging the affirmative force of constitutional courts after decades in which the judicial power that Judge Motley
and her colleagues unleashed has waned.12
board’s proposed “freedom of choice” plan as insufficient for ensuring desegregation);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II ), 349 U.S. 294, 299–301 (1955) (laying out guidelines for
judicial participation in carrying out desegregation of public schools).
5. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971) (striking down
the California public school funding system and requiring equal expenditures per pupil),
aff’d, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 384–85 (N.J. 1990) (holding
that “the State must assure that [its] educational expenditures per pupil are substantially equivalent” across districts); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 297 (N.J. 1973) (holding that the
state must ﬁll in gaps in local funding to meet the constitutionally guaranteed educational
opportunity); Douglas S. Reed, Court-Ordered School Finance Equalization: Judicial Activism
and Democratic Opposition 116–18 (1996), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs97/97535g.pdf [http://
perma.cc/X2EA-YF37] (listing state and federal court school-ﬁnance decisions).
6. See James S. Liebman & David Mattern, Correcting Criminal Justice Through
Collective Experience Rigorously Examined, 87 S. Cal. L. Rev. 585, 589–91 (2014) (surveying Supreme Court decisions imposing a bureaucratic “constitutional code of procedure”
on criminal justice systems).
7. See, e.g., Samuel Walker & Carol A. Archbold, The New World of Police Accountability 48–49 (2d ed. 2014) (citing decrees and court settlements).
8. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 680–81 (1978) (affirming a thirty-day limit on isolated conﬁnement in prisons); Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial
Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America’s Prisons 30–50
(1998) (providing an overview of judicial prison reform through the late-twentieth century).
9. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 376–79 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (imposing
command-and-control regulations on Alabama’s mental institutions).
10. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (requiring predeprivation
hearings before seizure of chattels pursuant to replevin statutes); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (requiring evidentiary hearings prior to termination of welfare beneﬁts); Anthony Michael Bertelli, Strategy and Accountability: Structural Reform Litigation
and Public Management, 64 Pub. Admin. Rev. 28, 28 (2004) (“Through structural reform
litigation, nearly half of all U.S. state-level child welfare agencies . . . had been brought under remedial decrees by March 1996.”).
11. See, e.g., James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School Desegregation Explained, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1467–70 (1990) [hereinafter Liebman, Desegregating Politics] (summarizing the impact of school desegregation efforts).
12. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1177, 1195 (2009) (dubbing institutional-reform decrees “a
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This Essay argues that the most fundamental lesson current advocates can learn from Judge Motley’s work lies not in the model of public
law litigation she and her contemporaries pioneered. Instead, the lesson
emerges from her generation’s creation of a litigation model in the
image of the most evidently effective form of governance of the day: bureaucracy. Crucially deﬁnitive of bureaucracy for current purposes is its
commitment to treating likes alike13—to, for example, deﬁning the classrooms, teachers, and curricula students need at each grade level and
mandating their equal provision to all children in that grade.
Today, however, the proliferating diversity and unpredictability of
everyday life have dethroned bureaucracy.14 Whether practiced by privatesector managers, public officials, or constitutional judges, bureaucracy’s
inflexible rules, roles, and hierarchies and its single-minded focus on treating likes alike promote a different, but no less destructive, brand of inequality and injustice: treating unlikes alike. They ignore vast differences in
individuals’ conditions that diversity and unpredictability multiply and
for which public actions must account if they are effectively to serve people’s needs. Today, that is, educators widely agree that mandating equal
access to a classroom, teacher, and curriculum designed for the “average
student” in each grade deprives the majority of “nonaverage” children—
often those who are not white and middle class or have special needs, gifts,
learning styles, or language barriers—of the differentiated services and
support they require to learn and succeed.15
For these reasons, private-sector managers and public officials in
many sectors in the nation and worldwide are abandoning bureaucracy
in search of other, more supple and responsive governance forms.16 It is
time, therefore, for civil rights advocates and constitutional judges to recognize, as well, that the era of bureaucracy—and thus of bureaucratically
inspired public law litigation—has passed.

dying breed”); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 Yale L.J.
1836, 1860–61 (2015) (doubting the “broad availability of systemic [constitutional] challenges” to how public institutions operate).
13. See, e.g., Rudi Volti, An Introduction to the Sociology of Work and Occupations
59–70 (2d. ed. 2012) (identifying bureaucracy’s key principles, including basing individuals’ treatment on their objective talents and needs, not their social status or personal
connections).
14. See, e.g., id. at 65–74 (associating bureaucracy’s effectiveness with relatively uniform and predictable conditions and tying its decline to the proliferation of diversity and
unpredictability).
15. See, e.g., Carol Ann Tomlinson, Reconcilable Differences? Standards-Based
Teaching and Differentiation, Educ. Leadership, Sept. 2000, at 6, 6–11 (describing the
need for “differentiation” in teaching and providing examples of harmfully standardized
curricula and of curricula beneﬁcially customized to student needs); Lory Hough, Beyond
Average, Harv. Ed. Mag. (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/ed/15/08/
beyond-average [http://perma.cc/XQ5G-NBRX].
16. See infra notes 53–56, 68–91 and accompanying text.
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Nowhere are new advocacy strategies needed more than for poor
and minority children trapped in failing public schools. In part because
of the depredations of bureaucratically organized school systems17 and in
part because of the courts’ refusal to extend to the rest of the nation the
beneﬁts that school desegregation decrees achieved in the South18—a
refusal attributable in part to the shortcomings of bureaucratic public
law litigation—the number of such children19 and the size of their
achievement gaps20 are rapidly increasing.
This Essay argues, therefore, that the current generation of advocates can best honor Judge Motley and her generation by imitating her
and her colleagues’ deeper strategy: by identifying the most generative
and effective form of governance of our own day and developing a new
model of public law litigation in its image. Building on other recent
scholarship,21 this Essay derives a new constitutional duty of “responsible
17. See infra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
747–48 (2007) (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406, 420 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–47 (1974).
19. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-16-345, K–12 Education: Better Use of
Information Could Help Agencies Identify Disparities and Address Racial Discrimination
10, 12, 42 (2016) (documenting the 2001–2014 increase in the proportion of the nation’s
schools attended mainly by high-poverty, black or Hispanic students from nine to sixteen
percent; the number of students of color attending racially isolated public schools; and
high-poverty schools’ “associat[ion] with worse educational outcomes”).
20. See, e.g., Michael DeArmond et al., Ctr. on Reinventing Pub. Educ., Measuring
Up: Educational Improvement & Opportunity in 50 Cities 36 (2015), http://www.crpe.org/
sites/default/files/measuringup_10.2015_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/9W7L-6946] (finding
that, on average, U.S. students eligible for free and reduced-price lunch suffer a fourteenpercentage-point achievement gap compared to other students); McKinsey & Co., The
Economic Impact of the Achievement Gap in America’s Schools 6, 9, 11 (2009), http://
mckinseyonsociety.com/downloads/reports/Education/achievement_gap_report.pdf [http://
perma.cc/66GN-Z6DE] (ﬁnding that, on average, black and Latino students are between
two and three years of learning behind white students and less than a third as likely to
score at an advanced level; estimating the economic impact of the nation’s persistent achievement gaps as “equivalent [to] a permanent national recession”); Kate Zernike, An F-Minus for
America’s Schools from a Fed-Up Judge, N.Y. Times (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/
2016/09/09/nyregion/crux-of-connecticut-judges-grim-ruling-schools-are-broken.html?_r=0
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that only eighteen percent of black
fourth graders read at or above “proﬁcient” on the National Assessment of Education Progress, compared to forty-six percent of their white peers).
21. See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, The Federal No Child Left Behind Act
and the Post-Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1703, 1706–07 (2003) (arguing that the No Child Left Behind Act can further “a new civil rights strategy that seeks
racial justice directly through increasingly equitable educational outcomes, rather than indirectly through racial balance”); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 183, 192 (2003) [hereinafter Liebman & Sabel,
Public Laboratory] (arguing that new reforms can continue the “movement for desegregation of the schools”); Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 3, at 1020 (discussing
lower courts’ experimentalist practice and the destabilization-rights approach to public
law intervention); Sabel & Simon, Duty of Responsible Administration, supra note 3, at
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administration” of public schools22 from a generative modern-day form
of governance referred to here as “evolutionary learning.”23
Evolutionary learning positions organizations to learn by doing. Rather than specifying one strategy for all, central actors (i) set general objectives (e.g., higher graduation rates); (ii) motivate and multiply opportunities for a wide array of actors in the ﬁeld (e.g., schools, educators,
and the communities they serve) to take planned and observed steps,
contextualized to local conditions, to move toward those goals; then (iii)
recognize successful interventions and use them to benchmark expectations for other similar sites while supporting the interventions’ customization to those sites.24 In turn, a judicially enforceable duty of responsible
administration treats officials’ creation of harmful conditions affecting
important constitutional interests or raising suspicions of invidious motivation (e.g., racially disparate graduation rates) as triggering a duty to

169 (comparing differing approaches to judicial remediation in cases of police forces found
to have engaged in unconstitutional practices); Rebecca I. Yergin, Note, Rethinking Public
Education Litigation Strategy: A Duty-Based Approach to Reform, 115 Colum. L. Rev.
1563, 1595 (2015) (proposing the adoption of a duty of responsible administration in constitutional public-education litigation); Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Courts as Institutional
Reformers: Bankruptcy and Public-Law Litigation 1 (Feb. 22, 2017) (unpublished manuscript)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing “the legitimacy and capacity of courts to
induce and supervise” reform by comparing bankruptcy reorganization and public law
litigation).
22. In Professors Sabel and Simon’s general formulation, public officials’ “duty of
responsible administration” is to “articulate reﬂectively the policies and principles that
govern their work,” “monitor the activities of peers and subordinates to induce compliance with these policies and principles,” and “frequent[ly] reassess[] . . . these policies and
principles in light of the officials’ own experience and that of comparable institutions.”
Sabel & Simon, Duty of Responsible Administration, supra note 3, at 166. Rather than prescribing solutions, courts “induce entities that have violated constitutional norms to undertake disciplined self-analysis of the extent and underlying causes of the harms they have
inﬂicted and a painstaking search for less burdensome alternatives.” Id. at 211; see also
Yergin, supra note 21, at 1587–88 (advocating for the application of a duty of responsible
administration to public school system reform); infra notes 155–156 and accompanying
text (discussing Yergin’s analysis). This Essay focuses on this duty’s application to schoolsystem reform.
23. See Christopher K. Ansell, Pragmatist Democracy: Evolutionary Learning as Public Philosophy 9–14 (2011) (“Evolutionary learning occurs when these three generative
conditions—a problem-driven perspective, reﬂexivity, and deliberation—work together in
a recursive cycle.”).
24. See, e.g., id. at 6–7, 9–16 (discussing the Chicago Police Department’s use of
evolutionary learning in community policing in the 1990s and discussing evolutionary
learning’s applicability to pragmatic public philosophy); infra notes 53–56 and accompanying text (highlighting Japanese automakers’ use of evolutionary learning); infra notes
65–95 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of evolutionary learning to education reform); infra notes 131–140 and accompanying text (examining the use of evolutionary learning in other contexts).
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moderate the harms at reasonable expense by implementing the learning process just described.25
Part I introduces the litigation model this Essay advances by outlining the application of a constitutional duty of responsible administration to children trapped in failing schools. Parts II–IV then explain why a
mismatch between modern conditions and the bureaucratic underpinnings of the old model of public law litigation call for a new approach to
litigation (Part II), why evolutionary learning is more suited to modern
conditions than bureaucracy (Part III), and how evolutionary learning
can be used to ameliorate harmful deﬁciencies and suspicious disparities
implicating constitutional interests (Part IV). Part IV closes with examples of Congress, courts, and administrative agencies enforcing existing
evolutionary learning obligations in nonconstitutional and constitutional
contexts, including in education settings. Finally, Part V gives a more detailed account of the application of this more modern form of public law
litigation to alleviate harms faced by poor and minority children in failing schools.
I. A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
NATION’S SCHOOLS, IN BRIEF
Applied to the K–12 context, the duty of responsible administration
would oblige officials who relegate poor and minority children to schools
with egregious educational-outcome deﬁciencies and disparities based on
race, ethnicity, poverty, special needs, or English-learner status to take
steps to determine whether and how they can diminish those deﬁciencies
and disparities without harm to other values.26 Given the importance of
education to individuals and the general welfare, and given continuing
suspicions that bias, stereotypes, and false assumptions contribute to the
inadequate educational outcomes of particular categories of children, ofﬁcials would have to attend and reasonably respond to evidence of serious deﬁciencies and disparities.
In keeping with evolutionary learning’s recognition of the importance of treating unlike children differently, the duty of responsible
administration identiﬁes educational deﬁciencies and disparities as actionable only when they have actually been shown to be reasonably corrigible. And, in assessing violations and deﬁning remedies, the new duty
encourages maximum flexibility for educators to discover such conditions
and respond appropriately. Often, the differential outcomes of traditionally
25. The duty may arise under federal or state equal protection, due process, adequate education, or similar provisions.
26. This duty must be triggered by measures that are locally authoritative, widely recognized, and correlated with success as an adult. Examples may include college attendance, college graduation, and high school graduation rates; accumulation of advanced
placement and other credit; students’ socioemotional preparation for higher grades; and
literacy, math, and science test scores.
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underserved children on whose behalf innovative steps have and have not
been taken will provide the best evidence of a violation and the strongest
basis for a remedy.
The duty of responsible administration requires a process that (i)
recognizes and tracks problems as they occur; (ii) identiﬁes and tests
reasonable steps for mitigating the problems without undercutting other
important values or meaningfully diminishing opportunities for other
public school children; and (iii) uses results of steps shown to reduce
negative outcomes for suspect categories of children to set minimum attainment and maximum disparity levels permitted for similarly situated
children in the defendant state or school district.27 To use an example
this Essay develops below, officials might base attainment minimums or
disparity maximums on their own or other jurisdictions’28 operation of
racially integrated magnet schools, interdistrict transfer opportunities, or
charter or other categories of schools in which students situated similarly
to the plaintiff children typically perform well and experience meaningfully smaller outcome disparities than the plaintiff children.29
The duty of responsible administration implies new remedies as well.
Courts should direct defendants who violate the duty to implement a
responsible system of the sort just described and to document the results
of efforts to mitigate educational deﬁciencies and disparities and the
steps taken in response to those results. In the meantime, courts should
direct defendants to avail the plaintiff children either of the innovations
that have proven to work for similarly situated children or of other
equally or more effective steps.
This strategy is modest and ﬂexible. It does not expect courts or institutions under their jurisdiction to have the prescience that bureaucratic
public law decrees require of central experts the courts and institutions
employ.30 It does not ask courts to require defendants to accomplish the
27. “Similarly situated” refers to children with family and demographic backgrounds,
economic means, and special education and English-language-learner statuses (among
other factors) that are similar to those of the plaintiff children. Notice that this approach
gives legal status to disparities not only between, say, black and white students but also between poorly performing black students in schools where most black students fail and otherwise similarly situated higher-performing black students in the same jurisdiction attending schools where success rates are higher.
28. The most obviously persuasive results are ones generated by steps that the defendant officials themselves have taken. Results achieved in other jurisdictions are also
persuasive, if they are of the sort that the defendant officials might have attended to pursuant to a responsible system for identifying and mitigating deﬁciencies and disparities, with
due recognition given to cross-jurisdictional differences.
29. See Yergin, supra note 21, at 1598–99 (suggesting an application of the duty of responsible administration to advance public-education reform in Connecticut); infra notes
170–172 and accompanying text (describing a lawsuit brought against the state of Connecticut based in part on this theory).
30. On the importance of experts under the bureaucratic public law model, see, e.g.,
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 9 (1971); Chayes, Role of the
Judge, supra note 3, at 1300–01.
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impossible or to engage in the self-consciously redistributive affirmative
action that an obligation to end all deﬁciencies and disparities would
entail. It does not even require defendants to advance all children to the
proﬁciency levels that their own official standards have identiﬁed as the
goal or norm in the jurisdiction.31 Indeed, the approach does not require
defendants to diminish disparities at all if they can show they have responsibly tried to do so and failed. And if the defendants have identiﬁed
steps that do diminish disparities without harming other interests in a
redistributive way, they would not be required even then—although they
might opt—to scale those same steps to all similarly situated children; the
defendants instead could choose to take other steps to reach the requisite minimum or maximum level. What the standard does require is that
defendants responsibly inquire whether deﬁciencies and disparities in access that affect at least modestly suspect categories of children can be
diminished without causing appreciable harm to other values and other
children and, if they can, that defendants incrementally reduce those
deﬁciencies and disparities in ways and to the extent their ongoing inquiries reveal to be possible.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF BUREAUCRACY AND BUREAUCRATIC PUBLIC LAW
LITIGATION
Given its modesty, substituting a duty of responsible administration
for the more directive remedies that bureaucratic public law litigation
pursues requires justiﬁcation. This Part explains why bureaucracy, although a brilliant model for public law litigation in Judge Motley’s day, is
no longer suited to modern conditions. The remainder of the Essay then
explains why evolutionary learning is better suited to those conditions
and illustrates courts’ and agencies’ adoption of evolutionary learning in
contexts that validate its use as a model for public law litigation built
around a duty of responsible administration.
The brilliance of Judge Motley and her generation was to realize that
the best way to convince courts to understand and cure constitutional violations was to characterize the violations as egregious deviations from,
and to order remedies that fully embraced, bureaucracy.32 Bureaucracy
was an attractive model, among other reasons, because it was widely embraced by the nation’s largest and most respected corporations and administrative agencies, as well as by the military.33 The culmination of this
31. The strategy proposed here does, however, use those standards to measure the
greater degree of educational attainment or lesser degree of disparity that the jurisdiction’s inquiry has shown to be achievable. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Meredith v. Fair, 305 F.2d 343, 348–49 (5th Cir. 1962) (describing a class
action complaint ﬁled by Judge Motley and colleagues against the University of Mississippi
alleging that the University pursued a state policy of segregation and seeking injunctive
relief).
33. See, e.g., Michael J. Piore & Charles F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide 19–48
(1984) (linking the mass-production systems characterizing large American corporations
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strategy was a public law litigation model that associated rights with the
deep bureaucratic principle of treating likes alike, found violations when
likes were treated differently, and imposed two types of bureaucratic,
rule-enforcing remedies: one in which courts ordered defendants to become (better) bureaucracies, the other in which courts acted as substitute bureaucracies.34
Characteristic of the ﬁrst type of remedy were court orders restructuring police forces, prisons, mental health facilities, and welfare agencies into functioning bureaucracies that centrally generated and hierarchically enforced uniform rules of their own choosing.35 In acting,
instead, as substitute bureaucracies, courts ordered defendant agencies
to implement one-size-ﬁts-all solutions; judges either developed these
solutions themselves based on competing proposals from the parties’
experts or they employed their own experts or “neoreceivers” to develop
and even, at times, implement them.36 Court-designed solutions in the
school desegregation context, for example, included mandated busing;
the siting, pairing, and clustering of schools to maximize racial integration;37 and mandated reading programs, in-service teacher training, and
during the middle part of the twentieth century to bureaucratic governance); Lisa Shultz
Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at
the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 47, 53 (2006) (explaining the administrative state’s embrace of an “expertise” model of governance). Put another way,
Judge Motley and her generation characterized the alleged constitutional violations in a
manner that associated them with failed governance models of old and sought remedies
that partook of a governance model then in wide and effective use. In her day, the old,
failed governance approaches tied the distribution of resources to caste, patronage, corruption, and other personal relationships irrespective of merit. Broadly accepted approaches
were bureaucratic. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Members of Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp. 401, 402–03
(N.D. Ga. 1959) (seeking an injunction barring those in charge of the Atlanta public school
system from operating racially segregated schools).
34. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural
Approach, 101 Colum. L. Rev. 458, 475–78 (2001) [hereinafter Sturm, Second Generation] (critiquing the “rule-enforcement model” in the context of employment discrimination disputes); Joanna Kudisch Weinberg, The Judicial Adjunct and Public Law Remedies, 1 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 367, 374 (1983) (describing the remedial role played in oldstyle public law litigation by judicial adjuncts).
35. See, e.g., Feeley & Rubin, supra note 8, at 40–41 (noting that classic prison decrees
“specif[ied] many requirements in . . . excruciating detail [including] the wattage of the
light bulbs in the cells, the frequency of showers, and the caloric content of meals”);
Charles Sabel, Litigation, Child Welfare Organization, and EBM, Nat’l Acads. (Jan. 30–31,
2012), http://nationalacademies.org/hmd/~/media/Files/Activity%20Files/Children/
UnderstandingChildAbuse/Presentations/Sabel13112.pdf [http://perma.cc/45FK-RNMX]
(noting child-welfare reform litigators’ desire to make decrees “as speciﬁc as possible”).
36. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 34, at 367–68 & nn.2–4.
37. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22–31 (1971)
(upholding a desegregation plan that included mandatory busing as well as pairing and
grouping of noncontiguous school zones); Jennifer L. Hochschild, The New American
Dilemma: Liberal Democracy and School Desegregation 27–28 (1984) (discussing Swann
and its aftermath); Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 3, at 1022–28 (describing desegregation decrees supervising how schools were sited, staffed, and administered).
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counseling for segregated children for whom integrated settings were
unavailable.38 Other examples include court-ordered ﬁnance formulas
for the orderly and equitable distribution of state funds to districts and
schools39 and codes of procedural rules for police and criminal courts to
use in enforcing the criminal laws40 or for agencies to follow in
administering welfare entitlements,41 terminating child custody,42 and
seizing property.43
Although brilliant and powerfully effective throughout the 1950s,
1960s, and well into the 1970s,44 the infusion of bureaucratic norms and
sensibilities into litigation strategies lost steam in the ﬁnal quarter of the
twentieth century,45 just as bureaucracy was losing its place as the dominant form of governance in nonjudicial settings.46 During that period,
bureaucracy began to succumb to the effects of the very features that
made it attractive as a model for rights- and equality-based advocacy—in
particular, its penchant for uniformity and its disposition to lump as
many conditions and people as possible into the same category or small
set of categories, and to require all those presumptive “likes” to be
treated alike.47
Bureaucracy assumes that (i) expertise is in short supply and best
amassed at the organizational center; (ii) the problems organizations
need to solve are relatively few and predictable; and (iii) actors at the
organization’s periphery, who are charged with implementing solutions,
lack expertise and are poorly aligned with organizational objectives.48
Based on these assumptions and following the “likes treated alike” norm,
bureaucracies depend upon the uniform implementation of a small
number of solutions developed by central experts.49 Bureaucracies assure
uniform implementation of solutions by disaggregating them into relatively rote steps that are assigned via rules, standard procedures, and
38. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 273 (1977).
39. See, e.g., Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 363 (N.J. 1990).
40. See Liebman & Mattern, supra note 6, at 586–91.
41. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 254–55 (1970).
42. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 745–46 (1982).
43. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 67–68 (1972).
44. See supra notes 2–11 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 52–63 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Piore & Sabel, supra note 33, at 3–7 (arguing that industrial organizations using the bureaucratic model slowed economic growth); Sturm, Second Generation,
supra note 34, at 475 (cataloguing difficulties bureaucracies face in solving modern problems due to limits on localization and experimentation).
47. See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., Governance of Steel and Kryptonite: Politics in
Contemporary Public Education Reform, 69 Fla. L. Rev. 365, 375 (2017) [hereinafter
Liebman et al., Governance of Steel] (claiming that bureaucracies have become less effective in modern times as conditions have become less stable and predictable).
48. See, e.g., id. at 373–75 (explaining how central experts in bureaucracies set rules
for actors lower down the hierarchy to prevent ﬁeld-level discretion).
49. Id. at 374.
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instructions50 to actors constrained by ﬁxed divisions of labor and hierarchical supervisors who themselves are checked by workers’ codiﬁed due
process protections.51
By the 1970s, many organizations began sensing that conditions
violating bureaucratic assumptions were becoming the norm.52 Faced
with ever more multifaceted, protean, and context-sensitive problems,
bureaucracies found themselves at a disadvantage to more ﬂexible organizations that ﬁrst entered the national consciousness in the form of
Japanese automakers.53 These more modern organizations were able to
respond to increasingly diverse and perplexingly entangled operational,
managerial, legal, environmental, and psychological factors by gathering
and sharing new and better information, building responsive institutional capacities, and more thoroughly incorporating local-level actors and
their superior contextual knowledge into the decisionmaking process.54
These organizations often succeeded by trusting ﬁeld-level workers to
customize solutions to conditions at the periphery of the organization
pursuant to the principle that those conditions had to be treated unlike
the idealized conditions imagined by experts at the center and unlike the
different conditions found at other local sites.55 Once better informed by
conditions that actually obtained locally and by comparing and spreading
the best of the locally proliferating solutions, the center could more
effectively achieve its objectives and serve the needs of its clients and
consumers.56
Observers had begun applying these same critiques to public agencies as early as the 1960s;57 by the 1990s, bureaucratic failure was an article of faith on both the right and the left. Conservatives blamed public
education bureaucracies, for example, for hemming in school leaders
50. Id. at 374, 378–80.
51. Id.
52. See Piore & Sabel, supra note 33, at 194–220.
53. See Liebman et al., Governance of Steel, supra note 47, at 423–24 (discussing how
Toyota overtook American car manufacturers by, among other steps, empowering assemblyline workers to identify and solve problems without instructions from central bureaucrats).
54. See id.; see also Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 34, at 475 (describing organizational changes needed to address problems of second-generation discrimination).
55. See Liebman et al., Governance of Steel, supra note 47, at 418, 423–24 (discussing
democratic experimentalism and Toyota’s use of workers as problem solvers).
56. See, e.g., id. at 423 (describing Toyota’s use of a localized inquiry process to gain
information about how to improve working conditions that is then shared across factories).
57. See, e.g., Michael Lipsky, Street-Level Bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the Individual in
Public Services 15 (30th Anniversary ed. 2010) (noting the inability of central experts in a
wide array of government agencies to establish rules sufficient to avoid exercises of ungoverned discretion by ﬁeld staff facing unanticipated complications); James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behavior: The Management of Law and Order in Eight Communities 83–84
(1978) (describing challenges patrol officers face when attempting both to abide by bureaucratic rules and to maintain order in dangerously unpredictable situations); William
H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 Md. L. Rev. 1, 36 (1985)
(documenting welfare bureaucracies’ inability to meet the needs of individual clients).
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with so many inﬂexible edicts and collective bargaining provisions that
they could not effectively manage schools.58 Liberals blamed them for
denying teachers the capacity for creativity and for sensing and serving
the variegated needs of students.59
The forces undermining bureaucracy in nonjudicial settings had a
similarly disruptive effect on bureaucratic public law litigation, ultimately
leading many courts to abandon it. Paralleling the critique of bureaucracy generally, the bipartisan knocks on bureaucratic public law litigation focused on the illegitimacy and incompetence of distant judges who
lacked both the democratically conferred authority and contextualized
knowledge needed to order changes that were appropriate for the vast
range of conditions present in the ﬁeld.60
The Supreme Court famously adopted these critiques as its own in
its 1973 decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.61 In
declining to embroil itself in school ﬁnance equalization litigation, the
Rodriguez Court refused to ﬁnd a constitutional right to education and to
treat disparities on the basis of wealth as constitutionally suspect, thereby
ushering in a decades-long moratorium on federal “right to education”

58. See, e.g., John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets, and America’s Schools
26 (1990) (“[The public school system] is too heavily bureaucratic—too hierarchical, too
rule-bound, too formalistic—to allow for the kind of autonomy and professionalism
schools need if they are to perform well.”); see also Mary Anne Raywid, Rethinking School
Governance, in Restructuring Schools: The Next Generation of Educational Reform 152,
153 (Richard F. Elmore ed., 1990) (“The second half of the twentieth century . . . has been
a period of increasing public skepticism about major societal institutions and of growing
lack of conﬁdence in large organizations.”).
59. See, e.g., Diane Ravitch, The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice Are Undermining Education 193–94 (2010) (criticizing
modern teacher-compensation systems for providing poor incentives for strong educational performance); Theodore R. Sizer, Horace’s Compromise: The Dilemma of the American High School 207, 210 (1992) (discussing the pitfalls of “pyramid governance” in
schools); Johnny Ray Youngblood & Kathy Maire, Opinion, Drain NYC’s School Swamp,
N.Y. Daily News (Feb. 12, 2002), http://ebc-iaf.org/sites/default/ﬁles/2002%20Drain%
20NYC%20School%20Swamp%20NY%20Post%20JRY%20%26%20Kathy%20Maire.pdf [http://
perma.cc/57VG-V3AH] (documenting the bureaucratic failures of the New York City public school system).
60. For criticism from the right, see generally, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts
and Social Policy 273 (1977) (arguing that courts lack the capacity to make complex social
policy decisions); Ross Sandler & David Schoenbrod, Democracy by Decree: What Happens when Courts Run Government 109–10 (2003) (questioning the legitimacy of decisions by judges on matters traditionally left to elected officials). For criticism from the left,
see generally, e.g., Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 3, at 1017–18, 1023
(explaining how courts’ shallow capacity to effect change in public agencies undermined
the effectiveness of public law litigation); Sturm, Second Generation, supra note 34, at 475
(arguing that judicial rule enforcement on the bureaucratic model cannot prevent modern forms of discrimination because rules speciﬁc enough to change behaviors cannot account for modern complexity, while more general rules cannot sufficiently inﬂuence the
subterranean behaviors that systematically harm minorities).
61. 411 U.S. 1, 43 (1973).
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litigation that is only now beginning to be challenged.62 Justice Powell’s
reasoning for the Rodriguez majority appeals directly to the knocks on bureaucracy noted above. “[T]he judiciary,” Powell wrote, “is well advised to
refrain from imposing on the States inflexible constitutional restraints that
could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and experimentation so vital to ﬁnding even partial solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions.”63
As was evident as early as the 1970s, bureaucracy today has little appeal to judges as a model for redressing deﬁcient and disparate educational outcomes that themselves are widely associated with the failings of
school bureaucracies. We can best honor Judge Motley, therefore, by
discarding the bureaucratic strategies her generation applied to such good
effect at the time and by replacing them with public-education reforms
that adopt the more ﬂexible governance structures of the private and
public organizations that recently have gotten the better of bureaucracy.
To be clear, the proposal here is not to give up on structural reform
through the courts; the very complexity of modern conditions that
brought old-style public law litigation down may require structural intervention if constitutional rights are to be vindicated.64 The point instead is
that the strategies used to bring about reform must change from bureaucratic to more modern and ﬂexible forms.
III. EVOLUTIONARY LEARNING AS A MORE UP-TO-DATE MODEL FOR
EDUCATION REFORM LITIGATION
This Part nominates evolutionary learning to serve the generative
purposes that bureaucracy served in Judge Motley’s day. Section III.A
describes evolutionary learning and offers a justiﬁcation for adopting it
as a model for modern public law litigation. Section III.B illustrates the
use of evolutionary learning in the operation of school systems, noting
how it nulliﬁes the Supreme Court’s rationale in Rodriguez for concluding
that constitutional courts cannot legitimately or competently intervene to
improve public-education systems.
A.

Evolutionary Learning in Public Administration Generally

Evolutionary learning is a process for self-consciously and rapidly
using feedback from an organization’s everyday responses to problems to
improve overall performance.65 Centrally supported and observed groups
of internal and external stakeholders at the ﬁeld level drive this process
62. Id. at 36.
63. Id. at 43.
64. See Noonan et al., supra note 21, at 14–18 (discussing instances in which structural reform is needed).
65. See Liebman et al., Governance of Steel, supra note 47, at 416–30 (using the term
“democratic experimentalism” to describe evolutionary learning as an alternative to existing models of public administration).
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through structured efforts to solve problems as they manifest themselves
at each local site. Actors at the center then identify effective strategies for
recognizable categories of problems by comparing and aggregating the
results achieved at each local site and spread what is learned throughout
the organization.
Although bureaucracy reigned supreme in its day, public-sector actors today disagree about the best replacement for bureaucracy.66 Key
contenders in addition to evolutionary learning include pure or simulated markets, managerialism (setting a few outcome targets and exposing managers to positive and negative consequences if they do or do not
reach the targets), and professionalism and craft (residing discretion cabined by collective norms in highly trained or accomplished actors).67
For reasons developed in detail elsewhere, evolutionary learning
eclipses these other models in two ways.68 Descriptively, evolutionary
learning has more widely and effectually supplanted bureaucracy in
ﬁelds as diverse as manufacturing, trade policy, research and development, labor standards, child welfare services, drug-addiction rehabilitation, food safety, environmental protection, policing, and public education.69 Normatively, evolutionary learning retains a feature of bureaucracy
that, although discarded by other contenders—baby with bathwater—is
crucial to problem-solving under complex conditions. Unlike the other
contenders, which treat knowledge as tacit and available only to the
market’s hidden hand or to actors in proportion to their innate talents
and instincts, evolutionary learning takes self-conscious steps to make
explicit the know-how of key actors, enabling more learning to occur
66. See id. at 404–14.
67. See id.
68. See id. at 416–19; Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 Geo. L.J. 53, 56–60 (2011) [hereinafter Sabel &
Simon, Minimalism] (criticizing bureaucracy and both market-based and managerialist alternatives to bureaucracy that aim to minimize the role of government).
69. See, e.g., Steven J. Spear, The High Velocity Edge: How Market Leaders Leverage
Operational Excellence to Beat the Competition 140–47 (2010) (describing Pratt &
Whitney’s adoption of evolutionary learning techniques to improve and reduce the cost of
developing new jet engine designs); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment
Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 831, 832–34 (2000)
(describing drug-treatment courts’ use and monitoring of individualized treatment plans
to increase experimentation and improve outcomes); Liebman et al., Governance of Steel,
supra note 47, at 423–30 (discussing the implementation of evolutionary learning in car
manufacturing, drug courts, environmental policy, policing, and special education);
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Contextualizing Regimes: Institutionalization as a
Response to the Limits of Interpretation and Policy Engineering, 110 Mich. L. Rev. 1265,
1267–69 (2012) [hereinafter Sabel & Simon, Contextualizing Regimes] (analyzing
arrangements in the face of uncertainty about effective policy prescriptions that prompt
stakeholders to experiment with new solutions); Charles F. Sabel, On Richard M.
Locke, the Promise and Limits of Private Power: Promoting Labor Standards in a Global
Economy, 12 Socio-Econ. Rev. 226, 228–30 (2014) (book review) (discussing Nike’s adoption of evolutionary learning programs for supplier ﬁrms and the effects such programs
have on labor conditions).
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more rapidly.70 What evolutionary learning adds to bureaucracy are steps
to make explicit the know-how of agencies’ dispersed ﬁeld staffs and
clients, as well as that of its central managers.71
In Rodriguez, the Court ascribed transcendent importance to its own
and administrators’ need but uncertain ability to access explicit knowledge
about whether, how, and to what extent education systems can improve
student outcomes.72 As is documented further in the next section, evolutionary learning’s capacity to meet that need makes it an especially appealing model for public law adjudication.
To be sure, the structures and disciplines needed to foster transparent learning by dispersed, imperfectly capacitated ﬁeld staff and client populations are costly, making other approaches seem more attractive.73 Many highly effective organizations, however, have overcome these
difficulties at reasonable expense, discovering an ability over the long
haul to outperform their own and other organizations’ strategies focused
on short-term optimization.74 Given that the very purpose of public law
litigation in all its forms is to prod organizations to bear the short-term
expense of transitioning to more effective governance models in order to
accelerate their capacity to achieve the Constitution’s and their own objectives, resistance to doing so is as much a reason as a problem for public law litigation.
B.

Evolutionary Learning in the Operation of Public Schools

Evolutionary learning’s promising but incomplete adoption by public
school systems illustrates two points just made. Evolutionary learning can
pay back its capacity-building costs and more in improved outcomes for
children. For that reason, the failure of school systems to build their own
learning capacity may justify resort, in egregious cases, to public law litigation in the image of evolutionary learning.
As is developed more fully elsewhere, when adopted by school officials in place of bureaucracy, evolutionary learning has achieved considerable success in the public-education context in, for example, Baltimore,
Boston, Charlotte, Denver, Houston, Nashville, New York, and Washington,

70. See Liebman et al., Governance of Steel, supra note 47, at 418, 433–34.
71. See id.
72. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973).
73. See Liebman et al., Governance of Steel, supra note 47, at 421–22, 430–31 (describing concerns about the workability of evolutionary learning).
74. See id. at 422–36 (offering responses in principle and practice to concerns about
evolutionary learning’s practicality); Sabel & Simon, Minimalism, supra note 68, at 79–80
(providing examples of evolutionary learning’s capacity to outperform strategies devoted
to short-term optimization). For collections of case studies of organizations that improved
their effectiveness and came to dominate their ﬁelds by using strategies for making knowhow explicit and accelerating learning, see generally Ansell, supra note 23, at 3–12; Spear,
supra note 69, at 9–19.
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D.C.75 Although these reforms have taken a number of forms, they typically involve school districts giving individual schools—often mixes of traditional and charter schools—greater responsibility, authority, and resources for responding to each student’s needs and for getting and keeping each student on track to graduate ready to succeed in college or a
career.76 Rather than prescribing uniform rules and procedures for each
school to follow, central state and district officials set standards, provide
educators with data and problem-solving procedures to assess and respond
to student needs, and monitor and use the results different schools
achieve as a basis for revising standards in light of what is shown to be
possible, spreading learning from school to school and managing the
overall portfolio of schools.77
In Baltimore, for instance, schools CEO Andres Alonso empowered
schools to implement their own plans for improving student outcomes,
developed qualitative and quantitative reviews of schools to help them
track student needs and successes, held regular meetings with principals
to review the success of their plans and identify steps schools and district
officials could take to foster improvement, and used the results to make
personnel decisions and structure the district’s overall portfolio of
schools.78 Alonso’s tenure coincided with notable increases in enrollment,
student attendance, test scores, and graduation rates.79
Likewise, New York City and Washington, D.C. have placed their
school systems under mayoral control, avidly implemented the Common
Core learning standards, given schools more autonomy while increasing
their accountability for results, and replaced failing schools with new
ones modeled on schools that had previously succeeded with similar populations.80 These reforms have also been associated with improved test
scores and graduation and college-attendance rates.81
Recent Louisiana legislation82 returning responsibility over New Orleans schools to the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) after a decade
of state control following Hurricane Katrina provides another interesting
evolutionary learning model. For years after the 2005 storm, the state-run
Recovery School District (RSD) oversaw the reestablishment and operation
75. See Liebman et al., Governance of Steel, supra note 47, at 390–401, 447–49; infra
notes 78–95 and accompanying text.
76. Typically, responsibility is formalized in learning standards and associated success
measures; authority includes control over budget, hiring and ﬁring teachers, use of time,
and school programs; and resources are allocated based on a formula driven by the relative learning challenges each child presents given, for example, her special needs and language barriers. See, e.g., Liebman et al., Governance of Steel, supra note 47, at 432–36.
77. See id.
78. See id. at 399–401.
79. See id. at 401.
80. See id. at 387, 393–98, 402–03.
81. See id. at 398–99, 402–03.
82. Act of May 12, 2016, 2016 La. Sess. Law Serv. 158 (West).
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of most New Orleans public schools, most of them charter schools.83
Among other ﬂexibilities, the RSD afforded schools substantial authority
to hire and ﬁre teachers.84 It also placed a high value on experimentation
in academic offerings and emphases, language-immersion programs, and
traditional curricula.85 As a whole, New Orleans schools operated by the
RSD after Katrina showed substantial gains compared to the performance of New Orleans public schools before the storm and the concurrent
performance of other Louisiana schools.86
Building on this success, while taking steps to assure that charter
schools do not “cream-skim” better-prepared students, underenroll specialeducation students, and overdiscipline children,87 the new legislation positions OPSB as a regulator and provider of services to, but not (with modest
exceptions) an operator of, schools.88 OPSB assigns all students in the district to schools based on family preferences using a parish-wide application and matching system designed to deter schools from using strategic

83. See Alan Greenblatt, New Orleans District Moves to an All-Charter System, nprED
(May 30, 2014), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2014/05/30/317374739/new-orleansdistrict-moves-to-an-all-charter-system [http://perma.cc/J2MC-6L3Q].
84. See, e.g., Douglas N. Harris, Good News for New Orleans, EducationNext, Fall 2015,
at 8, 14 (discussing New Orleans school leaders’ freedom to make personnel decisions as a
result of reforms adopted in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).
85. See, e.g., id. at 8, 14 (discussing empirical evidence that providing a “degree of
differentiation in schooling options” enabled more tailored choices by families, while
greater ﬂexibility in making instructional, personnel, and other decisions enhanced the effectiveness of New Orleans schools).
86. A recent study comparing pre- and post-reform outcomes in New Orleans concluded that the reforms raised student test performance by eight to ﬁfteen percentage
points, greatly reducing the performance gap between New Orleans and other Louisiana
schools. Douglas N. Harris & Matthew Larsen, Educ. Research All. for New Orleans, The
Effects of the New Orleans Post-Katrina School Reforms on Student Academic Outcomes 6
(2016) [hereinafter Harris & Larsen, Effects], http://educationresearchalliancenola.org/
ﬁles/publications/The-Effects-of-the-New-Orleans-Post-Katrina-School-Reforms-on-StudentAcademic-Outcomes.pdf [http://perma.cc/4FNF-C5JY].
87. See, e.g., Complaint-Class Action at 19–35, Berry v. Pastorek, No. 2:10-cv-04049
(E.D. La. filed Oct. 26, 2010), http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/
downloads/case/pb_v_pastorek.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y6K4-ZWUQ] (alleging violations
of the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act based on the exclusion of students with disabilities from New Orleans charter schools); Howard Blume, UnionCommissioned Report Says Charter Schools Are Bleeding Money from Traditional Ones,
L.A. Times (May 10, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/education/me-union-charterstudy-20160509-snap-story.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that
relative to traditional public schools, Los Angeles charter schools enroll a smaller proportion of the most expensive special-needs students); Stephanie Simon, Special Report: Class
Struggle—How Charter Schools Get Students They Want, Reuters (Feb. 15, 2013), http://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-charters-admissions-idUSBRE91E0HF20130216 [http://perma.cc/
UMH7-3PNG] (identifying tactics some charter schools use to inﬂuence which students do
and do not apply).
88. Harris & Larsen, Effects, supra note 86, at 3.

2017]

PERPETUAL EVOLUTION

2023

behavior in recruiting students.89 With funding apportioned according to
the educational needs of each child, all New Orleans’ schools have full
responsibility and full personnel, budget, and programmatic authority,
without interference from OPSB, to decide how to educate children.90
OPSB, however, retains authority to create new schools based on family
demand and the success of different school models and to close existing
traditional schools and withdraw charters based on chronically low School
Performance Scores.91 OPSB also has sole authority, on request by schools,
to expel children or impose other serious discipline92—a power charter
and other schools had previously been accused of exercising to push out
low-performing students93—and it operates citywide schools for students
suffering the effects of trauma94 and for incarcerated youth.95
Notice how evolutionary learning implemented by willing school systems alleviates the concerns about the inaccessibility of know-how and
other features of bureaucratic public law litigation that drove the Rodriguez
Court to withdraw from the school-reform ﬁeld.96 Fueling the Court’s
worries about the legitimacy and efficacy of judicial intervention were
doubts about the plaintiffs’ and courts’ ability (i) to demonstrate the existence and seriousness of educational deﬁciencies and disparities facing
school children complaining about the impact of different school funding or other conditions97 and (ii) to identify—as bureaucratic public law
89. Douglas N. Harris et al., The New Orleans OneApp, EducationNext, Fall 2015, at
17, 17–18,.
90. See Harris & Larsen, Effects, supra note 86, at 3–7.
91. See id. at 3–4; Andrew Vanacore, What New Orleans Can Teach Betsy DeVos
About Charter Schools, Politico (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2017/01/what-new-orleans-can-teach-betsy-devos-about-charter-schools-214610 [http://perma.cc/
GFP9-2KEA] (noting that OPSB will regain control over decisions to open and close charter schools in 2018).
92. See Act of May 12, 2016, 2016 La. Sess. Law Serv. 158, 160 (West); Jonathan Chait,
How New Orleans Proved Urban-Education Reform Can Work, N.Y. Mag. (Aug. 24, 2015),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2015/08/how-new-orleans-proved-education-reformcan-work.html [http://perma.cc/STS9-D7BL] (noting that, because of the citywide disciplinary process, principals cannot use disciplinary measures to push out low-performing
students).
93. See Vanacore, supra note 91 (discussing charter schools’ practice of expelling the
hardest-to-serve students).
94. See Mallory Falk, New Program Will Serve Students with Mental and Behavioral
Health Needs, New Orleans Pub. Radio (Aug. 25, 2015), http://wwno.org/post/newprogram-will-serve-students-mental-and-behavioral-health-needs [http://perma.cc/F3FMM5XS].
95. See Youth Study Center, City of New Orleans, http://www.nola.gov/youth-studycenter/ [http://perma.cc/2PCE-KYX4] (last updated June 2, 2017).
96. See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 n.56, 55
(1973) (calling the alleged correlation between per-pupil expenditures and school quality
“a matter of considerable dispute among educators and commentators” and noting that the
Court is “unwilling to assume for ourselves a level of wisdom superior to that of legislators,
scholars, and educational authorities in 50 States”).
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adjudication required—one or a small number of effective treatments for
the offending conditions.98 The Court, that is, had no authoritative basis
for deciding which children were falling below what valid educational
standards and whether there was anything educators could reasonably be
expected to do about it.
Over the last decade and more, however, explosive growth in educational standards, measurement technologies, pedagogical strategies, and other
tools educators applying evolutionary learning structures use to diagnose
and gradually diminish educational deficiencies have filled these gaps.99
Nearly all states now have educational standards that are authoritative in
multiple senses, having been promulgated by legislatures or administrative
agencies, designed by educators, blessed by educational experts and the
federal government, and validated by their connection to individuals’
success as adults and with the nation’s economic and civic health.100 States
and districts also have developed aligned measures of whether students
achieve the standards101 and routinely and publicly document deficiencies
98. Id. at 56 (“[T]here is nothing simple or certain about predicting the consequences of massive change in the ﬁnancing and control of public education. Those who have
devoted the most thoughtful attention to the practical ramiﬁcations of these cases have
found no clear or dependable answers . . . .”).
99. See Laura S. Hamilton et al., RAND Corp., Standards-Based Reform in the United States: History, Research, and Future Directions 17–24 (2008), http://www.rand.org/
content/dam/rand/pubs/reprints/2009/RAND_RP1384.pdf [http://perma.cc/9MXNH669] (documenting the evolution of standards-based reform efforts in the United
States); Nat’l Acad. of Educ., Standards, Assessments, and Accountability 2–3 (2009),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED531138.pdf [http://perma.cc/NP6T-THDD] (discussing
standards-based reform efforts and their impact on education outcomes). Evolutionary
learning strategies use standards and measures to motivate and empower educators to diagnose educational deﬁciencies and to test and improve solutions. Using standards and
measures instead to evaluate and impose consequences on schools, educators, or students
is associated with a different governance form sometimes called “managerialism.” See supra
notes 65–71 and accompanying text.
100. See Yergin, supra note 21, at 1568–69, 1596–97 (noting that forty-three states
have been permitted to waive provisions of the No Child Left Behind Act in favor of their
own comprehensive plans to use publicly available data to improve student outcomes and
describing the duties such plans impose on states); see also, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State
Educ. Dep’t, State Education Department Releases Revised NYS English and Mathematics
Learning Standards (May 2, 2017), http://www.nysed.gov/news/2017/state-educationdepartment-releases-revised-nys-english-and-mathematics-learning-standards [http://perma.cc/
9NMD-Q22T] (“These new [literacy and math] standards recognize the importance of
preparing New York’s children for success in life and provide the foundation needed to get
there.”).
101. See, e.g., Paul E. Barton, National Education Standards: Getting Beneath the Surface
32 (2009), http://www.ets.org/Media/Research/pdf/PICNATEDSTAND.pdf [http://perma.cc/
2T76-H6HP] (offering a comprehensive overview of U.S. education standards and noting
that federal laws have “required states to develop and align content standards and
assessments”); David Figlio & Susanna Loeb, School Accountability, in Economics of
Education 383, 392, 400–14 (Eric A. Hanushek et al. eds., 2011) (inventorying standards
and measures used to assess student success in schools); Michael J. Petrilli & Aaron
Churchill, Why States Should Use Student Growth, and Not Proﬁciency Rates, when Gauging School Effectiveness, Thomas B. Fordham Inst. (Oct. 13, 2016), http://edexcellence.net/
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and disparities by race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and other categories
in children’s success in meeting the standards.102
These same tools enable school officials to expose with ever-increasing
acuity categories of students—including those assigned to particular schools
and teachers—who systematically exceed or fall short of the state’s learning standards and the outcomes that demographic and other conditions
predict students will likely attain.103 By revealing which classrooms and
schools routinely outperform or underperform expected outcomes,
evolutionary learning tools uncover policy options associated with changes
in the portfolio of such schools and classrooms and how students are
distributed among them. By making explicit evidence of why certain schools,
teachers, and interventions outperform others in particular situations,
evolutionary learning enables educators to alter pedagogical and other
responses to the needs of students and to conditions associated with their
home life, neighborhoods, and economic status in ways that can improve
students’ chances of success.104
As this section illustrates in the context of public education, evolutionary learning in operation provides what both bureaucracy and many
of its alternatives fail to offer and what the Court identiﬁed in Rodriguez
as a prerequisite to public law adjudication of a constitutional right to an
education: an ability to proliferate and access learning about what ails
egregiously failing schools or other systems and how to ﬁx them without
assuming the panoptic prescience of courts and other centralized actors.
The next Part considers whether judges and allied regulatory agencies
are capable of adopting evolutionary learning strategies for this and similar purposes.
IV. EVOLUTIONARY LEARNING IN LAW AND LEGAL ACTION
This Part explains how evolutionary learning operates not simply as
a feature of administrative environments under review by courts but also
articles/why-states-should-use-student-growth-and-not-proficiency-rates-when-gauging-school
[http://perma.cc/3E8H-RD8D] (advocating measures of student year-to-year academic
growth over static measures of proﬁciency levels attained).
102. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, Commissioner Elia Identiﬁes 144
Struggling and Persistently Struggling Schools to Begin Implementation of School Receivership in New York State (July 16, 2015), http://www.nysed.gov/news/2015/commissionerelia-identifies-144-struggling-and-persistently-struggling-schools-begin [http://perma.cc/5WS6X68F]; see also supra notes 19–20.
103. See, e.g., Debora Mitchell, Six Arizona Schools Named “Beat the Odds Schools,”
AZEdNews (Feb. 17, 2015), http://azednews.com/six-arizona-schools-named-beat-the-oddsschools/ [http://perma.cc/52J5-UWUG] (listing schools that “Beat the Odds” by, among
other things, showing consistently improved test scores); Press Release, Ga. Dep’t of Educ.,
1000+ Georgia Schools ‘Beat the Odds’ in 2016 (Feb. 28, 2017), http://www.gadoe.org/
External-Affairs-and-Policy/communications/Pages/PressReleaseDetails.aspx?PressView=default&
pid=510 [http://perma.cc/76KG-Y7PA] (noting schools that outperformed statistical expectations given demographics and other predictive factors); see also supra notes 19–20.
104. See, e.g., Liebman & Sabel, Public Laboratory, supra note 21, at 289.
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as a model for how courts and other legal institutions should conduct
such review. Sections IV.A (for contexts other than education) and IV.B
(for education) illustrate how legal actors in nonconstitutional settings
already use evolutionary learning to decide whether a condition subject
to regulatory or legal redress (e.g., racial discrimination) is present and,
if so, what steps can be taken to moderate that condition. Sections IV.C
through IV.E then, respectively, explore evolutionary learning in use in
constitutional litigation in noneducation, higher-education, and K–12
contexts.
A.

Evolutionary Learning in Nonconstitutional Law Generally

Evolutionary learning can help courts respond to another important
problem to which Rodriguez alludes105: how to acquire evidence of discriminatory intent—a key predicate for equal protection violations based
on racial disparities106—without direct access to subjective motivations
that actors can easily, and often unconsciously, conceal.107 Although the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the possibility of objective evidence of
racial intent,108 it rarely relies on such evidence, fearing that doing so
might tempt judges to commit their own equal protection violations by
compelling race-conscious redistributive affirmative action to bring disadvantaged minorities up to the level of the majority.109 Evolutionary learning structures offer a way to avoid this problem by exposing objective
evidence of the presence or absence of invidious purpose without compelling or risking racially redistributive affirmative action.110 They do so
by observing how officials whose actions are associated with harmful racially disparate outcomes respond to opportunities to experiment with
modest iterative steps to diminish disparities at little or no cost. This section
105. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 60 (1973).
106. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
107. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 322 (1987) (marshaling evidence
suggesting that “a large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is inﬂuenced by unconscious racial motivation”).
108. A number of cases illustrate how racial motivation may be shown through objective evidence (i.e., without directly accessing decisionmakers’ subjective thoughts). See,
e.g., Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464–65 (1979) (discussing inferences
from defendants’ adoption of racially segregative strategies for siting and assigning children to schools over other reasonable but less segregative options); Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977) (discussing inferences
from segregative siting and assignment decisions for public housing); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (inferring racial motivation from the nearly perfectly
segregative effect of irregular and illogical lines drawn to separate municipalities from
each other); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886) (inferring discriminatory
motivation from a pattern of discretionary licensing of laundries that excluded virtually all,
and only, Chinese applicants).
109. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
720–21 (2007); Washington, 426 U.S. at 245–46.
110. See supra note 108.
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provides a number of legislative, administrative, and adjudicative examples
of evolutionary learning employed in this fashion, some dating back to
Judge Motley’s time as a civil rights advocate.
As courts have come to interpret them, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,111 the Fair Housing Act of 1968,112 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)113 all have evolutionary learning features. Under the reigning doctrine in all three contexts, evidence
of disparate outcomes based on race, ethnicity, gender, or age puts the
responsible actors under an obligation to identify a nondiscriminatory
purpose for their disparity-creating actions.114 By putting actors at risk if
they do not do so, these standards essentially create a before-the-fact duty
to take note of disparities their actions create and to diminish those disparities if they can do so without harm to other legitimate interests. Rather than forbidding disparities and requiring affirmative action to end
them, these regimes make the existence of disparities the occasion for inquiring whether they can be diminished at little or no cost.115
Even more explicitly, a number of legislative116 and administrative117
mandates tied to federal funding require local agencies receiving federal

111. § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be . . . unlawful . . . for an
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
112. § 804(a), 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (“It shall be unlawful . . . to refuse to sell or rent . . . a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin.”).
113. § 4(a), 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s age.”).
114. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2507, 2516–22 (2015) (adopting an objective approach to adjudicating discrimination under the Fair Housing Act); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 592–93 (2009) (ruling
that, in order to survive a disparate treatment claim, the City of New Haven had to establish a legitimate reason for discarding test results that otherwise would have awarded ﬁreﬁghting jobs to white and Hispanic applicants); Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 235
(2005) (assessing motivation objectively under the ADEA); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“Congress [in Title VII] has placed on the employer the burden of
showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment
in question.”); see also James S. Liebman & Michael Mbikiwa, Every Dollar Counts: In Defense of the Obama Department of Education’s “Supplement Not Supplant” Proposal, 117
Colum. L. Rev. Online 36, 42–43 (2017), http://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/2017/02/March-2017-LM-Online.pdf [http://perma.cc/3URZ-E3Z3] (explaining the rationale behind requiring the defendant to produce a different, legitimate explanation after the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination).
115. See Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Beyond the Private Attorney General: Equality Directives in American Law, 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1339, 1368 (2012) [hereinafter Johnson, Equality
Directives] (discussing administrative regulations enforcing the requirements of Title VI
and Title VIII by requiring state actors to take affirmative steps to identify and moderate
racially uneven results of federally ﬁnanced programs).
116. See, e.g., the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a);
Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003, id. § 15605(a)–(e); American Recovery and Reinvest-
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dollars to take note of any racially disparate impact or segregative effect
of their actions and to monitor the effect of modest experimental steps
to diminish the disparities without undue cost. In the juvenile justice context—the most fully studied of these mandates—a succession of such small
steps has been associated with major declines in the national rate of juvenile detention.118 Examples include telephone reminders of and transportation to court hearings, which diminish otherwise common and racially
uneven detention orders based on juveniles’ failure to appear in court.119
By exposing officials’ willingness to tolerate known and easily avoidable disparities with no legitimate basis, these duties to inquire and
experiment provide evidence of invidious motivation, conscious or otherwise. More importantly, the steps these duties impel may alter motivations, especially unconscious ones, by confronting officials with both the
effect and lack of a justiﬁcation for their racially disparate actions.120 In
the juvenile justice context, for example, the steps noted above may lead
officials to see that assumptions that may have formerly disposed them to
detain certain categories of children more often than others—for example, that failure to appear in court evidenced guilt, ﬂight proneness, or
irresponsibility—are wrong.121
ment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 5004(g), 123 Stat. 115, 504 (codiﬁed as amended in
scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
117. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,166, 3 C.F.R. § 289 (2001); 28 C.F.R. § 31.303 (2016);
id. pt. 115; Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Memorandum on Initial Implementing Guidance for the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 § 1.6,
at 7 (2009); see also Johnson, Equality Directives, supra note 115, at 1383 (detailing the requirements set out in the executive order).
118. See, e.g., Act 4 Juvenile Justice Working Grp., The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act: A Fact Book 2, 10–11 (2007), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/
Downloads/Resources/jjdpafactbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/BW5M-K6KE] (discussing the
Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Act and its role in helping reduce youth incarceration); see also The Annie E. Casey Found., Reform the Nation’s Juvenile Justice
System (2009), http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-IssueBriefJuvenileJusticeReform2009.pdf [http://perma.cc/UDZ2-6NHN]; Richard A. Mendel, The Annie E. Casey Found.,
Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative Progress Report 2014, at 11–20, 26 (2014),
http://www.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-2014JDAIProgressReport-2014.pdf#page=14 [http://
perma.cc/3SNW-QT68] (claiming that declines in juvenile incarceration are due, in part,
to the foundation’s partnership with the federal government to promote experimentation
with detention-reduction activity, supported by federal grants).
119. See Sabel & Simon, Contextualizing Regimes, supra note 69, at 1290.
120. See, e.g., Johnson, Equality Directives, supra note 115, at 1365–66 (describing
affirmative duties to track and ameliorate racial disparities and racial segregation that various civil rights statutes and associated administrative regulations impose on state actors receiving federal funding); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Stimulus and Civil Rights, 111 Colum. L.
Rev. 154, 200–04 (2011) (describing new approaches to civil rights accountability based on
a duty to track and moderate racial disparities).
121. For discussions of the possible effects on the dispositions of state actors of encouraging them to discover relatively simple but previously unimagined ways of reducing
racial disparities, see generally, e.g., Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules, 107 Colum.
L. Rev. 374, 401–06 (2007); Sabel & Simon, Contextualizing Regimes, supra note 69, at
1290.
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Evolutionary Learning in Nonconstitutional Law in the K–12 Education
Context

In Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, the Supreme Court gave
an evolutionary learning gloss to a federal education statute for the ﬁrst
time, construing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)122
to require school districts to provide disabled students with education
services that are “reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”123 By giving
school officials a statutory duty of reasonable inquiry, Endrew F. buttresses
a response given above to one of the key worries about public law litigation on an evolutionary learning model.124
In place of the prescience that old-style public law litigation demanded
of courts and agencies in identifying simple substantive solutions for complex problems, evolutionary learning requires courts and officials to preside
over a muscular process of local experimentation and shared learning
that may seem no less unrealistic and demanding. Based on this concern,
some lower courts prior to Endrew F. had limited judicial intervention in
IDEA cases to bright-line situations in which schools failed to exercise
their discretion and thus to provide disabled students with any educational
benefit at all.125 Supporting this approach is the extreme personalization of
the central obligation IDEA imposes: to engage school administrators,
special-education experts, service providers, teachers, parents, and the
student in developing and implementing an Individualized Education
Plan (IEP) customized to the needs of each child requiring special
services.126 Each plan includes data analyzing the child’s current performance, annual goals, services for meeting the goals, and tools for measuring
progress.127
The Endrew F. Court, however, rejected both old-style review strategies that courts had previously followed: standing aside and letting presumptively expert school bureaucracies exercise their discretion, or
standing in for presumptively failed education bureaucracies and imposing their own view of educational adequacy.128 In an evolutionary learning mode, the Court instead directed lower court judges to review IEPs
based on how responsibly school officials designed and learned in each
122. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2012).
123. 137 S. Ct. 988, 999 (2017).
124. See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
125. The lower court in Endrew F. held that the school met its educational duty when it
provided disabled students with more than de minimis services. Endrew F. ex. rel. Joseph
F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 798 F.3d 1329, 1338 (10th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. at
1002.
126. Office of Special Educ. & Rehab. Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., A Guide to the Individualized Education Program 7 (2000), http://www2.ed.gov/parents/needs/speced/iepguide/
iepguide.pdf [http://perma.cc/T962-EDB5].
127. Id. at 5–6.
128. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 999.
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case from the documented process of analysis and information sharing
among educators, experts, and parents in developing the IEP in question.129 By the time a dispute reaches a courtroom, judges should expect
school authorities to offer a cogent and responsible explanation—much
of it based on what has been learned about the student’s needs and appropriate responses from intervention options tested along the way—of
why the IEP under review is reasonably calculated to allow the student to
make educational progress given his or her unique needs.130
The analysis Endrew F. imagines for individual students thus provides
another analogy for how future courts may assess claims of egregiously
inadequate or unequal educational opportunities for student bodies at
large. If school officials cannot offer a reasonable explanation—based on
their own self-conscious process of hypothesizing and testing solutions—
of how they have tried to moderate existing educational deﬁciencies and
disparities or why progress is currently impossible, then courts should
step in and require the officials to undertake that iterative learning
process.
The next three sections consider examples of evolutionary learning
principles driving a federal constitutional duty for officials to inquire
whether and how they can mitigate harms to important interests. Section
IV.C focuses on institutional reform litigation outside education, section
IV.D on litigation over the use of preferential admissions in higher education for diversity purposes, and section IV.E on what several recently filed
constitutional education reform lawsuits reveal about evolutionary learning in the K–12 context.
C.

A Constitutional Duty of Responsible Administration in Noneducation Contexts

Over the last decade or two, courts have resorted to evolutionary
learning mechanisms to remedy alleged constitutional violations by public institutions that affect liberty interests. Unlike traditional public law
litigation, these suits do not involve courts or receivers they appoint in
the management of defendant agencies or in the identiﬁcation of particular substantive policies that agencies must implement. Instead, the decrees seek more broadly to improve “governance, [transparency], and
accountability” through “self-monitoring and assessment” and “a framework of ongoing elaboration and adaptation.”131 Typically via consent
decrees, courts order agencies to establish their own preliminary standards and ways of tracking the harmful conditions that prompted the
suit.132 Courts then order the agencies to develop and test those preliminary practices and to use the lessons from those experiments to revise

129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id.
Noonan et al., supra note 21, at 2, 34–35.
See infra notes 134–140 and accompanying text.
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the initial standards, provide benchmarks for acceptable future results,
and identify presumptively effective practices.133
Examples of this progression in remedial orientation from old to
new public law include structural reforms of mental health facilities,134
prisons,135 and police forces.136 In contrast to the command-and-control
decrees that prevailed in each of these areas in the 1970s and 1980s,137
more recent orders set broad goals and give states and institutions latitude to determine—that is, to learn iteratively—how to achieve them. Illustrative examples include a 2001 “Compliance Plan” for Washington,
D.C. mental health institutions explicitly eschewing detailed prescriptions of policies and procedures and instead establishing mutually agreedupon goals, tasks, and outcome criteria for assessing effectiveness;138 a
prison medical care consent decree in which the California Department
of Corrections agreed to adopt a “quality-assurance system with signiﬁcant accountability to outside professionals and the plaintiff class”;139 and
decrees that require police forces to develop policies with respect to
commonly encountered contexts in which police activities have proven
controversial, require officers to record instances of behavior covered by
the policies and the reason for actions taken, and require police departments to use the data collected to create benchmarks for appropriate behavior and deﬁne deviations from the benchmarks that trigger inquiry.140

133. See infra notes 134–140 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 3, at 1030–32 (discussing gradual replacement of command-and-control remedies with court-ordered administrative inquiry processes in court-ordered mental health reforms).
135. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 533–37 (2011) (adopting a remedy for prison violations requiring prison officials to monitor and develop responses to constitutionally questionable incidents); Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of
Judicial Intervention in Prisons, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 805, 856–59 (1990) (describing prison
reform decrees utilizing a “deliberative remedial formulation process” managed by defendants with court oversight).
136. See Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 3, at 1043–44 (analyzing
U.S. Department of Justice lawsuits against police forces); Sabel & Simon, Duty of Responsible Administration, supra note 3, at 193–95 (describing the Cincinnati Police Department’s implementation of a settlement decree through “Problem-Oriented Policing” focused on iterative cycles of problem deﬁnition, intervention, impact assessment, and
revision).
137. See supra notes 34–43 and accompanying text.
138. See Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 3, at 1032–33.
139. Stipulation for Injunctive Relief at 9–12, Plata v. Davis, No. C-01-1351 TEH (N.D.
Cal. June 20, 2002), http://www.cphcs.ca.gov/docs/court/plata/2002-06-13_Stipulation_
for_Injunctive_Relief.pdf [http://perma.cc/77KR-GH2F]; see also Sabel & Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 3, at 1039–40.
140. See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 668, 685–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(ordering New York City police to conduct a “pilot project” equipping patrol officers with
body-worn cameras in selected precincts to test their impact on police misconduct); Sabel
& Simon, Destabilization Rights, supra note 3, at 1044; Sabel & Simon, Duty of Responsible Administration, supra note 3, at 183–84.
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D. Hints of Constitutional Evolutionary Learning in the Higher Education
Context
Evolutionary learning has also inﬂuenced constitutional litigation
through the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fisher v. University of
Texas (Fisher II ).141 Although not the same, the questions in the Title VII
and similar contexts discussed in section IV.A above and in Fisher II mirror
each other. In the Title VII context, the question is how to generate objective evidence of whether allegedly race-neutral actions with racially disparate results are invidiously motivated without imposing an unconstitutional duty on prospective defendants to engage in racially retributive
affirmative action in order to avoid liability.142 In Fisher II, the question
was how the University of Texas (UT) could demonstrate that admittedly
race-conscious admissions decisions were a constitutional effort to achieve
compelling pedagogical beneﬁts from racial diversity and not an unconstitutional form of racially redistributive affirmative action.143 As in the
Title VII and related contexts, evolutionary learning provided the answer
in Fisher II.
Prior to Fisher II, the Supreme Court had held that government entities could engage in benignly motivated racial decisionmaking only if beforehand they produced a strategy for doing so that fully articulated a
compelling diversity or other nonracially redistributive objective and
provided a mechanism that demonstrably allowed only as much racial
decisionmaking as was necessary to achieve that objective.144 Not surprisingly, the Court had never found those requirements met, given how difﬁcult they are to achieve absent some amount of trial and error.145 Much
to the surprise of Justice Alito and the other dissenting Justices, however,
the Fisher II majority affirmed UT’s race-conscious admissions policy even
though the policy admittedly did not, as of then, meet the Court’s
preexisting requirements.146 The Court did so after ﬁnding that UT’s
race-conscious admissions were part of a responsible process for gradually
and iteratively (i) identifying the kinds of diversity that are compellingly
141. 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
142. Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I . . .
write separately to observe that [the Court’s] resolution of this dispute merely postpones
the evil day on which the Court will have to confront the question: Whether, or to what
extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII . . . consistent with . . . equal
protection?”).
143. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205–06, 2211.
144. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. (Fisher I ), 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2418 (2013); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 734–35 (2007).
145. See, e.g., Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 786–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (ﬁnding a
compelling state interest for race-based decisionmaking but also concluding that the
means chosen to effectuate the interest were not sufficiently tailored).
146. 136 S. Ct. at 2239 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The Equal Protection Clause does not
provide a 3-year grace period for racial discrimination. Under strict scrutiny, UT was required
to identify evidence that race-based admissions were necessary to achieve a compelling interest before it put them in place—not three or more years after.”).
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important and possible to achieve only through racial decisionmaking
and (ii) ascertaining how far race-based decisionmaking can be minimized while still achieving those diversity goals.147
As summarized by the Court, UT’s process provides a case study in
evolutionary learning. UT began by testing race-neutral admissions,
“spen[ding] seven years attempting to achieve its compelling [diversity]
interest using race-neutral holistic review” of college applications.148 Only
after “[n]one of these efforts succeeded” and “a reasonable determination was made that the University had not yet attained its goals” did UT
embark on a “signiﬁcant evolution” of a race-conscious policy.149 To learn
iteratively what was possible, UT experimented with different types of
diversity the university might try to achieve and different steps for achieving them, using “the experience the school has accumulated and the
data it has gathered since the adoption of its admissions plan” to make
“periodic reassessment[s] of the constitutionality, and efficacy, of its admissions program” and provide a “reasoned, principled explanation” of
actions it took at each step.150 Crucially, the Court understood these actions as satisfying an ongoing constitutional duty of responsible inquiry
triggered by its involvement in actions that otherwise violated the
Constitution:
Through regular evaluation of data and consideration of student experience, the University must tailor its approach in light
of changing circumstances, ensuring that race plays no greater
role than is necessary to meet its compelling interest. The University’s examination of the data it has acquired in the years
since petitioner’s application, for these reasons, must proceed
with full respect for the constraints imposed by the Equal Protection Clause. The type of data collected, and manner in which
it is considered, will have a signiﬁcant bearing on how the University must shape its admissions policy to satisfy strict scrutiny
in years to come.151
In so ruling, the Court replaced a constitutionally required product—
a pristine deﬁnition of diversity and plan for achieving it with the least
amount of racial decisionmaking—with a responsible process for developing that product over time; the Court thus abandoned a bureaucratic solution in favor of an evolutionary learning one. UT evidently adopted
this way of proceeding, and the majority approved it, for the same reason
this Essay promotes evolutionary learning as a model for modern
education reform litigation: It allows iterative progress toward constitutional

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 2209–10 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2213.
Id. at 2205, 2212–13.
Id. at 2205, 2210–12.
Id. at 2210.
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and other compelling state goals without insisting on impossible prescience by blocking action until its results are entirely predictable.
This Essay thus reads Fisher II to suggest that severe harms to important interests like education or egregious racial disparities may trigger
a federal constitutional obligation of responsible inquiry into how to
diminish those conditions without undue cost. Default of this obligation
would then provide evidence of a toleration of deﬁciencies or disparities
that is unconstitutional for lack of any good reason.
These propositions invite two serious objections. First, it might be argued that a duty of responsible mitigation of severe educational deﬁciencies or disparities demands too much of the Constitution. The trigger for
the duty in Fisher II was UT’s presumptively unconstitutional raceconscious decisionmaking. In contrast, the duty proposed here is triggered by deﬁciencies or disparities that, however harmful, are not presumptively unconstitutional. Recall, however, that Congress and at times
the Court have deemed it reasonable in the Title VII, fair housing,
ADEA, and juvenile justice contexts to treat analogous harms and disparities as sufficient to trigger this same duty of inquiry,152 so it would not be
unreasonable for the Court to follow suit when the deficiencies and disparities affect contexts like education and race in which constitutionally important interests are undeniably at stake. This is especially so, given that
the duty suggested here is far less demanding than the one imposed by
Fisher II: to see if the deﬁciencies or disparities can be avoided at little or
no cost, not, as in Fisher II, to avoid racial decisionmaking at all costs save
for a compelling state interest. And default of this duty merely evidences,
without absolutely establishing, a constitutional violation.
Suggesting instead that the argument proposed here asks too little of
the Constitution, reform lawyers making it would have to acknowledge—
in an effort to convince federal courts to require school officials to try to
eliminate some serious educational deﬁciencies and disparities—that not
all such disparities and deﬁciencies are legally corrigible. Illustrating the
impact of that concession is the “universal belief” that the similar compromise underlying Title VII has fallen short of “eradicat[ing] . . . discrimination” in employment.153 But, at least in the context of K–12
education, with generation after generation of poor and minority children suffering the effects of egregious outcome deﬁciencies and disparities with no redress in sight from bureaucratic public law litigation—and
given evidence that evolutionary learning remedies can make gradual
progress in eliminating disparities and increasing the welfare of disadvantaged individuals154—a new strategy is worth trying.

152. See supra notes 111–119 and accompanying text.
153. Chuck Henson, Title VII Works—That’s Why We Don’t Like It, 2 U. Miami Race
& Soc. Just. L. Rev. 41, 42 (2012).
154. See supra notes 24, 53–56, 69, 74, 78–95, 116–119 and accompanying text.
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Traditional and Novel Strategies in Recent Constitutional Litigation in the
K–12 Education Context

In a recent law review note, Rebecca Yergin imagines how successful
transitions from command-and-control to evolutionary-learning-based
public law litigation in other contexts might extrapolate to constitutional
challenges to deﬁciencies and disparities in K–12 education.155 Under
Yergin’s approach, states and districts would have an obligation to take
note of serious educational deﬁciencies or racial disparities, systematically explore ways to mitigate them without undue costs or harms to other
children, and either extend innovations that prove to be effective with
some disadvantaged students to others similarly situated or provide the
latter students with equally or more effective alternative solutions.156
To elaborate Yergin’s approach and illustrate how much of a change
in education litigation it implies, this section locates seven recently ﬁled
educational-deprivation lawsuits on a spectrum from old-style to new-age
public law litigation. Two of the suits—D.R. v. Michigan Department of
Education157 and Gary B. v. Snyder,158 both ﬁled in Michigan federal
courts—seek to enforce a federal constitutional right to an adequate education. Both rely on the magnitude of educational deprivation in, respectively, Flint and Detroit, Michigan, to remove Rodriguez as an obstacle to
that objective.159 The complaint in Gary B. is illustrative. The sickening
conditions in the six Detroit schools it describes are so intolerable and
the constitutional right to basic literacy that the complaint asserts is so
modest that it is hard to imagine a federal judge turning a blind eye.160
To remedy the situation, however, the prayer for relief takes a classically
bureaucratic approach. Calling upon the court to substitute itself for the
failed district- and state-level bureaucracies, the complaint asks the court
to identify, then order the schools to implement, “appropriate literacy
instruction at all grade levels, including instruction in the alphabetic principle, ﬂuency, and comprehension in grades K–3, and instruction in
comprehension, motivation, word study, fluency, and vocabulary in grades

155. Yergin, supra note 21, at 1596 (positing a new litigation strategy to reform failing
school systems based on a duty of responsible administration).
156. Id.
157. Class Action Complaint at 120–21, D.R. v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., No. 2:16-cv-13694AJT-APP, 2017 WL 3642131 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 24, 2017) [hereinafter D.R. Class Action
Complaint], 2016 WL 6080952.
158. Class Action Complaint at 123–24, Gary B. v. Snyder, No. 2:16-cv-13292-SJM-APP
(E.D. Mich. ﬁled Sept. 13, 2016) [hereinafter, Gary B. Class Action Complaint], http://
www.publiccounsel.org/tools/assets/files/0812.pdf [http://perma.cc/KQ7Y-3BNB]; see also
Tawnell D. Hobbs, Lawsuit Targets Detroit Public Schools for Failing Students, Wall St. J.
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawsuit-targets-detroit-public-schools-for-failingstudents-1473808179 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
159. D.R. Class Action Complaint, supra note 157, at 5–7; Gary B. Class Action Complaint, supra note 158, at 1–17.
160. See, e.g., Gary B. Class Action Complaint, supra note 158, at 1–17.
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4–12.”161 To impel Michigan officials to operate as a better bureaucracy
themselves, the prayer for relief asks the court to order them to identify
and remove “conditions antithetical to literacy instruction in Plaintiffs’
schools, such as insufficient teacher capacity, deplorable school conditions, and [the absence of] trauma-informed practices.”162 As compelling
as the complaint’s facts and asserted right to basic literacy seem to be, the
very enormity of the ﬁscal, physical, pedagogical, and trauma-related calamities afflicting the plaintiff children might lead a federal judge to despair of acquiring the centralized prescience that the suit’s bureaucratic
frame would require in order to prescribe effectively ameliorative policies.
Four of the remaining suits, all of them ﬁled in state court—Davids
v. State 163 (in New York), Forslund v. State 164 (in Minnesota), H.G. v.
Harrington165 (in New Jersey), and Vergara v. State 166 (in California)—challenge state personnel rules governing the rapid conferral of tenure, the
use of seniority rather than teacher quality to sequence reductions in
force, and the procedure for dismissing teachers for poor performance.167
Because all four complaints attack classically bureaucratic procedures,
alleging that they disproportionately saddle disadvantaged children with
ineffective teachers by denying school officials the ﬂexibility needed to
161. Id. at 128; see also D.R. Class Action Complaint, supra note 157, at 128–32 (requesting detailed relief, including specific procedures for health screening and employee training and appointment of a special monitor to collect and implement expert recommendations).
162. Gary B. Class Action Complaint, supra note 158, at 128–29.
163. Veriﬁed Class Action Complaint, Davids v. State, No. 101105/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Davids Complaint], http://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/
1212617/nyc-parents-union-class-action-lawsuit.pdf (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
The court denied the subsequent motion to dismiss while granting a stay pending appeal.
See Davids, 2015 WL 7008097, at *2.
164. First Amended Complaint, Forslund v. State, No. 62-CV-16-2161 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Oct. 26, 2016) [hereinafter Forslund Complaint], 2016 WL 8608311. The court subsequently
dismissed the complaint and plaintiffs appealed. See Forslund, 2016 WL 8578375, at *1, appeal ﬁled, No. 62-CV-16-2161 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2017).
165. Complaint, H.G. v. Harrington, No. MER-L-2170-16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May
4, 2017) [hereinafter H.G. Complaint], http://edjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/
Complaint-H.G.-v.-Harrington-Stamped-copy.pdf [http://perma.cc/2AHC-GDQK]. The court
subsequently dismissed the complaint and plaintiffs appealed. See H.G., No. MER-L-217016 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. May 4, 2017), appeal ﬁled, No. MER-L-2170-16 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. May 24, 2017).
166. Complaint, Vergara v. State, No. BC484642 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2014) [hereinafter Vergara Complaint] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). Plaintiffs prevailed in
the trial court but the Court of Appeal reversed on appeal. Vergara v. State, 209 Cal. Rptr.
3d 532 (Ct. App.), review denied, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 532, 652 (2016).
167. Vergara Complaint, supra note 166, at 4, 11, 13, 16–17 (making each of these challenges); Forslund Complaint, supra note 164, at 21–22, 25 (challenging several Minnesota
statutes that purport to cause each of the above-identiﬁed problems); H.G. Complaint,
supra note 165, at 23 (challenging a New Jersey statute mandating that teacher workforce
reduction decisions be made on the basis of tenure rather than effectiveness); Davids Complaint, supra note 163, at 4–5 (challenging New York’s extensive process for the dismissal
of ineffective teachers as “far exceed[ing] the level of protection required under the
Constitution”).
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match teachers to student needs,168 the lawsuits might seem to fall on the
evolutionary learning side of the litigation spectrum. The structure of the
litigation itself, however, has more affinity with bureaucratic public law
litigation than with evolutionary learning. Rather than using iterative
testing and demonstrated success in particular contexts to deﬁne the
duty or remedy at issue, the suits seek to replace the challenged policies
with unproven blanket alternatives of the plaintiffs’ or courts’ choosing.
That approach makes the suits susceptible—as already has occurred in
Vergara—to adverse rulings that the alleged violations and requested remedies are not sufficiently related to the particular educational deﬁciencies and disparities shown.169
The seventh complaint—a Connecticut federal action styled Martinez
v. Malloy—attacks rules and practices that keep the State from expanding
the number of charter schools, racially integrated magnet schools, and
interdistrict transfer options available to students despite evidence that
students in the small number of these settings that the State has facilitated outperform their peers in traditional public schools.170 On one reading, the complaint is classically bureaucratic, treating those three interventions as a “three-sizes-ﬁt-all” ﬁx for what ails Connecticut public
education. On the other hand, by criticizing the State for failing to learn
something from its own test cases about how to reduce massive outcome
disparities among children,171 the Martinez complaint has evolutionary
learning leanings, and one of its several causes of action adopts a selfconsciously evolutionary learning approach.172 Hoping to spur progress
toward the new form of public law litigation that Martinez, alone among
recent education reform lawsuits, envisions, the next Part offers a
detailed conceptualization of a constitutional duty of responsible administration of the nation’s schools.

168. Vergara Complaint, supra note 166, at 11 (criticizing California’s bureaucratic
teacher-hiring and teacher-ﬁring policy); Forslund Complaint, supra note 164, at 6 (discussing the negative effects of Minnesota’s teacher-hiring and teacher-retention program);
H.G. Complaint, supra note 165, at 2 (attacking New Jersey’s “quality-blind teacher layoff
and employment statutes”); Davids Complaint, supra note 163, at 3–5 (challenging New
York’s bureaucratic tenure laws).
169. Vergara, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 557 (ﬁnding no constitutional violation, despite
adverse consequences under the statutory scheme, because “[t]he evidence did not show
that the challenged statutes inevitably cause this impact”).
170. Complaint at 22–23, 26, 34, Martinez v. Malloy, No. 3:16-01439 (D. Conn. ﬁled
Aug. 23, 2016), http://studentsmatter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Martinez-v.-MalloyComplaint.pdf [http://perma.cc/FK4D-UUYZ] (using the State’s own testing data to show
that its charter schools, interdistrict magnet schools, and transfer options offer a superior
education compared to traditional public schools serving identical populations of low-income
and minority students).
171. On average, Connecticut’s poor and minority students perform several grade levels behind their more affluent and white peers. Id. at 18–19, 22–23, 26.
172. See id. at 67–68.
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V. A CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY OF RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATION OF THE
NATION’S SCHOOLS, IN DETAIL
This Part begins by identifying four premises—satisfied in many states
and school districts—for a duty to undertake a responsible process for
inquiring whether students’ serious educational deﬁciencies and disparities can be diminished without signiﬁcant harm to other interests:
1. Plaintiff poor and minority school children experience vast educational deﬁciencies and disparities compared to wealthier and white children in speciﬁed educational outcomes.173
2. In the state’s own estimation, achieving those outcomes is crucial
to children’s future quality of life, exercise of liberty, and acquisition and
enjoyment of property. To begin with, administrative, statutory, and constitutional law and guidance in nearly every state explicitly acknowledge
the importance of these outcomes, commit the state to providing services
that enable children to achieve them, and prescribe standards and measures for assessing whether they have been achieved.174 Additionally, the
law of all states treats children’s access to those services and outcomes as
sufficiently important to justify seriously curtailing parents’ and children’s liberty by requiring children to attend schools meeting state requirements during substantial portions of thirteen successive years.175
3. The state’s estimation is widely shared, given (a) the recognition
of a right to a public education in at least forty-nine of ﬁfty state constitutions176 and numerous state court decisions holding education to be a
fundamental right;177 (b) the proliferation of increasingly rigorous state
173. See, e.g., supra notes 157–172 (citing complaints alleging educational deficiencies
and disparities in schools in California, Connecticut, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, and
New York).
174. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
175. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society.”). States’ compulsory attendance laws typically require children to attend schools meeting state standards for 180 days
each year. See, e.g., N.Y. Educ. Law § 3604(7) (McKinney 2015). The Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized the seriousness of parents’ and children’s liberty interests that compulsory education laws curtail. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (balancing the State’s interest in having children obtain an education against parents’ interests
in directing the upbringing of their children).
176. Avidan Y. Cover, Is “Adequacy” a More “Political Question” than “Equality?”: The
Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education Finance, 11
Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 403, 404 & n.6 (2002) (stating that forty-nine of ﬁfty state constitutions have right-to-education clauses, and noting that scholars disagree as to whether
Mississippi’s constitution contains an education clause).
177. See, e.g., Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 313 (Minn. 1993) (“[E]ducation is a
fundamental right under the state constitution, not only because of its overall importance
to the state but also because of the explicit language used to describe this constitutional
mandate.”); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (“[T]he mandatory requirement of ‘a thorough and efficient system of free schools,’ found in Article XII, Section 1 of
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and federal education standards;178 (c) the Supreme Court’s repeated
recognition of “the importance of education to our democratic society”
and of “a student’s legitimate entitlement to a public education as a
property interest which is protected by the Due Process Clause;”179 and
(d) the consensus that education is essential to individual, communal,
and national well-being.180
4. The state can fairly be identiﬁed as a signiﬁcant cause of the
outcome deﬁciencies and disparities, and can justiﬁably be expected to
do something about them, given that its own test cases (or, at least, those
of states about which it does or should know) have enabled children similarly situated to the plaintiffs181 to avoid or face signiﬁcantly smaller deﬁciencies and disparities in regard to those outcomes.
Taken together with the judicial, legislative, and administrative precedents discussed above for recognizing an obligation of inquiry and
responsible redress when important life, liberty, and property interests of
the sort education implicates intersect with serious deprivations and
racial, ethnic, and economic disparities,182 these premises are sufficient
to create a modest constitutional duty of evolutionary learning. In the
education context, that duty requires the defendant state or school district to track high educational failure rates as well as racial and other disparities, study their likely causes, and test ways to diminish them. When
the defendant state’s own experience (or the well-documented experience of other states in similar circumstances) provides evidence that
those disparities may be meaningfully diminished through reasonably
available means—ones that do not pose signiﬁcant harms to other important interests—the state must employ those ameliorative means, or
others that are at least as effective in alleviating the disparities, while
monitoring and adjusting based on the results. A state may avoid this
our Constitution, demonstrates that education is a fundamental constitutional right in this
State.”); Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 333 (Wyo. 1980) (“In
the light of the emphasis which the Wyoming Constitution places on education, there is
no room for any conclusion but that education for the children of Wyoming is a matter of
fundamental interest.”); Liebman, Desegregating Politics, supra note 11, at 1494 n.156.
178. See supra notes 99–102 and accompanying text.
179. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975); Brown, 347 U.S. at 493; see also Liebman,
Desegregating Politics, supra note 11, at 1494 n.156 (citing other Supreme Court decisions
recognizing this right).
180. See, e.g., Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane, Restoring Opportunity: The Crisis of Inequality and the Challenge for American Education 8–9, 20–21 (2014) (noting the
importance of education to intergenerational economic mobility in the United States);
Michael Greenstone et al., The Hamilton Project, A Dozen Economic Facts About K–12
Education 1 (2012), http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/
THP_12EdFacts_2.pdf [http://perma.cc/G987-PYKF] (citing the importance of education
as a means for Americans to prosper and “share the bounty of our economy more
equally”).
181. See supra note 27 (deﬁning the term “similarly situated” as used here).
182. See supra Part II; supra sections IV.A, IV.B (discussing the rise and fall of bureaucracy and its replacement by evolutionary learning).
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duty only by providing a substantial explanation based on legitimate public policy—including the demonstrated absence of workable solutions—
for why the state has taken no effective action.183
These obligations may be anchored, as well, in the Court’s postRodriguez jurisprudence on the right to an education. In Plyler v. Doe 184
and Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools,185 the Supreme Court concluded
that under certain egregiously aggravating circumstances, a state’s denial
of educational services to some but not all children—in Plyler, for example, to immigrant children unlawfully in the country—triggers “a heightened level of equal protection scrutiny” requiring a “substantial state interest” to justify the disparity.186 Absent a substantial explanation grounded
in state policy, the state classiﬁcation in question is unconstitutional. This
principle, together with the other legal doctrines discussed above at the confluence of the Constitution’s protection of individual liberty and assurance

183. The explanation must be sufficient to keep the state’s deficiency- or disparity-creating
actions and failure to ﬁnd ways to ameliorate the deﬁciencies and disparities from (i) conveying a message that plaintiff schoolchildren are less capable or deserving of achieving
state-speciﬁed outcomes than other children, or (ii) showing that the state is “deliberately
indifferent” to those children’s failure to achieve those outcomes. The former test draws
on the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 593 (1989) (noting that “governmental endorsement of religion ‘preclude[s]
government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred’”(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)
(O’Connor, J., concurring))); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984) (O’Connor,
J., concurring) (deﬁning Establishment Clause violations as government action “making
adherence to a religion relevant . . . to a person’s standing in the political community” by,
for example, “send[ing] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community”). The latter test draws on the Court’s “deliberate indifference” standard in prison conditions cases. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378,
388 (1989) (“We hold today that the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis
for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.”); Sabel & Simon, Duty of Responsible Administration, supra note 3, at 181–82 (“In the public sector, courts in 1983 cases have
qualiﬁed the classical insistence on top-level authorization by holding that ‘deliberate indifference’ on the part of senior administrators will suffice.”).
184. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
185. 487 U.S. 450 (1988).
186. Id. at 459 (discussing the “unique conﬂuence of theories and rationales” that led
the Plyler Court to apply “a heightened level of equal protection scrutiny” requiring proof
“that [the challenged] classiﬁcation advanced a substantial state interest” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting))); see also
id. at 224 (“In light of these countervailing costs, the discrimination contained in [the
state action] can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial goal of
the State.”); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 283–85 (1986) (discussing levels of scrutiny
applied in previous educational-rights decisions); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217–18 (“[I]n these
limited circumstances we have sought the assurance that the classiﬁcation reﬂects a reasoned judgment consistent with the ideal of equal protection by inquiring whether it may
fairly be viewed as furthering a substantial interest of the State.”).
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of equal protection of the laws, supports the relatively modest “middlelevel” constitutional duty and scrutiny advocated here.187
Rather than seeking to have all of the moving parts of this argument
come together immediately in a single evolutionary learning equivalent
of the Court’s monumental decision in Brown, today’s advocates are again
advised to follow the example of Judge Motley, her mentors, and her
colleagues. In their decades-long lead-up to Brown, they started small,
experimented widely,188 and secured an iterative series of court victories
against the day’s separate-but-equal orthodoxy: that a state could not pay
black matriculants’ tuition at an out-of-state law school in lieu of admitting them to the state law school reserved for whites or providing them
with their own, equal school;189 that a separate black law school was
unconstitutionally unequal to the law school the state provided for white
students given the quality of its facilities, its more diverse curricula, its
reputation, and the career opportunities it afforded;190 and that a
university was not providing equal education when it required blacks and
whites to sit apart.191 These cases built on each other, using lessons learned
in each case to determine what was possible factually as well as legally and
to improve the breadth and power of their arguments.192 Rather, therefore, than setting sail immediately on a course expected to lead directly
to a watershed Supreme Court decision—or, on the other hand, waiting
to start until airtight plugs have been found for all the holes in the argument as currently conceived—advocates are encouraged to identify a
range of starting points and directions and learn together as they go.
CONCLUSION
In working to replace the centralized command-and-control logic of
the public law litigation that prevailed in the last century with the more
flexible and iterative evolutionary learning model proposed here, educationrights advocates should be no less opportunistic than were Judge Motley
and her contemporaries. Although imperfect in each case, all of the analogies drawn here—to judicial and administrative interpretations of Title
VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Fair Housing Act,
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, and various funding limits
187. This argument draws support from the Supreme Court’s recent affirmation of the
evolving content of the liberty interests the Constitution protects and of the close relationship between due process and equal protection in protecting those interests. See Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598, 2602–03 (2015).
188. See, e.g., Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s Struggle for Equality 108, 132, 189–92, 259 (2004) (discussing
legal strategies employed by the NAACP).
189. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 349–50 (1938).
190. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633–34 (1950).
191. McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637, 640–41 (1950).
192. See Kluger, supra note 188, at 16–18, 104, 109, 113–14, 189–92, 216–19, 225–32,
236–37, 287–94 .
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on support for racially disparate results; to the Supreme Court’s application of the Fourteenth Amendment to preferential higher education admissions; and to lower courts’ adoption of a constitutional duty of responsible administration of mental health facilities, prisons, and police forces—
provide fodder, and, in the aggregate, encouragement, for litigative creativity on par with Motley’s and her contemporaries’ ingenuity.
Although the evolutionary learning in which school officials around
the nation are voluntarily engaging to improve the academic outcomes
of poor and minority children is the ﬁrst line of attack on egregious educational deﬁciencies and disparities, judicial intervention is required
where no such learning is taking place. If we are to continue today to
build on the progress begun by Constance Baker Motely and her contemporaries, however, that review itself must be in service of learning—the
courts’ and school officials’, as well as students’. Thankfully, the many analogies discussed here suggest that courts may be ready to take on that learning task.

